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MICHAEL MURALI
Black Beauty—How Schultz and the Trial of Marion  
True Changed Museum Acquisitions
I. INTRODUCTION
Collecting remainders of history has long been a human pastime. Looting and the trafficking of looted items, especially art, were common as far back as ancient Egypt.1 Yet, even in ancient times, 
notable figures decried the plundering of ancient artifacts and 
other items of value.2 Many of these items of historical value 
ended up in world famous museums, including the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York City, Louvre in Paris, and British 
Museum in London.3 By the 1970s, colonial plundering was no 
longer a legitimate means to acquire ancient art, so museums 
began looking to a different source to bolster their antiquities 
collections.4 As a result, the trafficking in stolen art and artifacts 
has become a multi-billion dollar endeavor rivaling the narcotics 
and arms industries.5 However, in recent years 
there has been a sea change in museums’ 
attitudes towards the collection of antiquities. 
United States v. Schultz6 and its predecessors, 
as well as the recent trial of Marion True in 
Italy7 have resulted in museums’ changed 
attitude towards establishing the prove-
nance of items they acquire and addressing 
patrimony claims.
This Article examines the diminishing 
role of black markets in the antiquities trade. 
In particular, this Article focuses on interna-
tional conventions, American case law, and 
the trial of Marion True to establish that there 
has been a slow move away from looted art in 
the American museum system. More importantly, this Article 
examines how the Italian trial of an outspoken advocate of 
caution in the acquisition of antiquities,8 Marion True, in the 
wake of Schultz has slowly shifted museums’ focus towards 
an emphasis on determining the origins of the items in their 
collections.
Part I addresses the UNESCO Convention, the Cultural 
Property Implementation Act (CPIA), the UNIDROIT 
Convention, and the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) 
and their relevance to the criminal prosecution of international 
cultural property crimes. Part II examines Schultz and its 
predecessors in establishing a domestic criminal law standard 
for prosecuting international cultural property theft under the 
NSPA, as well as alternative methods of prosecution in the 
United States. Finally, Part III addresses the unique and fasci-
nating case of the J. Paul Getty Museum (the Getty)—perhaps 
the largest culprit of acquiring antiquities on the black market—
and how the trial of Marion True has changed the way museums 
conduct business in the United States.
II. PAINT BY LETTER—UNESCO, THE CPIA, 
UNIDROIT, AND THE NSPA
While frowned upon, looting during peacetime was an 
accepted practice.9 Following the Napoleonic Wars, however, 
the international community realized the destructive power 
of war could easily cripple a state’s vast 
cultural heritage.10 The 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions spawned the Hague Regulations, 
of which Article 56 embodied the spirit of a 
changing worldview; it initiated the large-
scale protection of cultural property.11 The 
Great War was the next catalyst; Europe, hav-
ing witnessed several cultural treasures looted 
and destroyed by the Kaiser, provided a man-
ner of restitution (arguably ineffectual) for 
some of the nations whose property was taken 
through the Treaty of Versailles.12 World War 
II brought about similar concerns. During the 
Nuremberg Trials, the Allied powers enforced 
the 1907 Hague Regulations in response to 
the extreme Nazi looting and destruction of Europe’s cultural 
heritage that occurred.13
Thus far, the international law concerned itself with loot-
ing during wartime. What, then, of cultural property crime 
during times of peace or art theft14 unrelated to war? Every 
state, naturally, had local laws concerning theft. However, the 
particularly large-scale of Hitler’s actions drew attention to the 
need to protect cultural property in view of international looting 
of culturally significant sites. Thus, from November 1-16, 1945, 
the Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
convened, creating the Constitution of UNESCO.15 UNESCO, 
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the uneven distribution of rights between artifact-rich states 
(typically claimants) and artifact-purchasing states (typi-
cally possessors/defendants).34 By ratifying the UNESCO 
Convention, artifact-purchasing states would be agreeing 
to allow suits to be filed in their courts using another state’s 
criminal laws, and this is an unlikely outcome.35 Even the U.S.’s 
incorporation of the UNESCO Convention conveniently left out 
this requirement. Instead, the U.S. forced all petitions to come 
through its government.36 As discussed in the following section, 
the CPIA provided the next step towards honoring repatriation 
claims and holding thieves criminally responsible.
2. The CPIA
The CPIA is the implementing legislation in the United 
States for the UNESCO Convention property provision, 
providing that
No article of cultural property documented as apper-
taining to the inventory of a museum or religious or 
secular public monument or similar institution in any 
State Party which is stolen from such institution after 
the effective date of this chapter, or after the date of 
entry into force of the Convention for the State Party, 
whichever date is later, may be imported into the 
United States.37
Whereas in the past, it was easier to fudge provenance 
claims, the passage of the CPIA in 1983 allowed the U.S. 
to start stemming the flow of black market antiquities into 
museums such as the Getty, the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
(the Met), and the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. If a possessor 
could not produce a valid export certificate for an item from a 
country party to the 1954 Hague Convention within ninety days, 
the item was subject “to seizure or forfeiture.”38 Such forfeited 
property would then be “offered for repatriation to the State 
Party from which the property was taken.”39 However, if the 
possessor acquired the item in good faith (such as when there is 
a clear chain of title to the cultural artifact), the state party would 
then have to pay the possessor fair compensation, unless there is 
a reciprocal arrangement with the U.S. waiving compensation 
claims.40 Perhaps most notably, the CPIA establishes the 
Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC), with eleven 
members serving three-year terms, appointed by the President:
[T]wo members representing the interests of museums; 
[t]hree members who shall be experts in the fields of 
archaeology, anthropology, ethnology, or related 
areas; [t]hree members who shall be experts in the 
international sale of archaeological, ethnological, and 
other cultural property; [and t]hree members who shall 
represent the interest of the general public.41
in turn, begat the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague 
Convention),16 which is the current international standard with 
regards to the protection of cultural property, both in times 
of war and peace.17 The Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague 
Convention amended it in 1999 (the Second Protocol).18 These 
conventions applied only in times of war;19 so beginning around 
1970, a series of international conventions and domestic laws in 
the United States addressed the serious issue of stolen cultural 
property during times of peace.20 This Part will address the 
impact of UNESCO on the international landscape, and how the 
U.S. has responded through the NSPA.21
A. UNESCO—THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
UNESCO’s 1954 Hague Convention was a watershed 
moment for cultural property protections. Unfortunately, it 
was largely ineffectual. Through the later part of the twentieth 
century, museums and private collectors continued to collect 
great amounts of stolen art and artifacts, often from archaeo-
logical digs.22 UNESCO continued its efforts to combat cultural 
property crime, but art theft, especially from digs, provided an 
easy way to quietly make a lot of money.23 Three developments 
created a more hostile atmosphere to art theft both domesti-
cally and internationally: (1) the Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property (the UNESCO Convention),24 (2) the CPIA, 
and (3) the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law’s (UNIDROIT) Convention on the International Return 
of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT 
Convention).25
1. The UNESCO Convention
The UNESCO Convention was a means for member states 
to “enter into pacts to enforce each other’s cultural property 
laws.”26 It covers a wide swath of items of cultural interest—not 
just those relegated items of archaeological significance.27 This 
convention grants standing to member states to sue in foreign 
courts to enforce the claimant’s national laws.28 Rather than 
focusing on the military, as previous conventions have done, the 
UNESCO Convention channels its attentions on the private trade 
in antiquities.29 Perhaps most promising is that one hundred and 
nine countries ratified it, including the United States in 1983.30
The UNESCO Convention proved to be a disappointment. 
There was “no enforcement mechanism or framework for how a 
claimant might be able to secure the return of cultural property,” 
stolen or otherwise.31 It is non-self-executing, so states do not 
have to adopt all the provisions contained within.32 It was not cre-
ated with private parties in mind (despite the relative proximity 
to World War II and claims by several private citizens for 
the return of their stolen property) and even the U.S. only ap-
plied it to state parties.33 Perhaps its greatest shortcoming is 
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The purpose of CPAC is to investigate the claims made 
by a state party and submit a report on the investigation to 
the President.42 CPAC also provides advice on international 
agreements to implement the UNESCO Convention.43
The CPIA has its shortcomings. For example, the require-
ment that a state party would have to pay the possessor fair 
compensation if the article is acquired in good faith may put a 
strain on countries with small economies that cannot spare the 
funds to recover their cultural 
heritage.44 Additionally, the 
CPIA created an exception for 
items of cultural property that 
have been in the U.S. for at least 
three years, in good faith, with 
publication, exhibition, or cata-
loguing of its presence.45 The 
CPIA also allows requests made 
through the U.S. government 
(specifically, the President) for 
cultural patrimony claims, with 
no direct action.46 Finally, the 
CPIA applies to objects (and 
fragments of such objects) that 
are of archaeological or ethno-
logical significance. An item is 
of archaeological significance 
if it “is of cultural significance, 
is at least two hundred and fifty 
years old, and was normally 
discovered as a result of scien-
tific excavation, clandestine or 
accidental digging, or explo-
ration on land or under water.”47 This definition, however, 
exempts items from modern times that are equally culturally 
significant.48 To redeem this defect, the CPIA also provides that 
an item is of ethnological significance if it is “the product of 
a tribal or nonindustrial society and important to the cultural 
heritage of a people because of its distinctive characteristics, 
comparative rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the 
origins, development, or history of that people.”49 This provi-
sion was most likely added to prevent the pillaging of tribal and 
native societies throughout the Americas.50
Thus, the CPIA provides a starting point in examining the 
interplay of the U.S. and UNESCO in the fight against art theft. 
Indeed the CPIA was perhaps the first major affirmative step 
in the U.S. towards establishing a standard for dealing with 
cultural property crimes. While the CPIA itself does not men-
tion the prosecution of cultural property, the U.S. has prosecuted 
several individuals for art theft.51 The body of international law 
continued to evolve; while there were several conventions52 to 
protect cultural property in the intervening years (including the 
recognition of underwater cultural heritage and the need for its 
protection in the Convention on the Law of the Sea),53 the next 
major development was the UNIDROIT Convention.
3. The UNIDROIT Convention
The UNIDROIT Convention applies to international claims 
for “the restitution of stolen cultural objects and the return of 
cultural objects removed from the territory of a Contracting State 
contrary to its law regulating 
the export of cultural objects 
for the purpose of protecting its 
cultural heritage.”54 Its primary 
goals included “restitution of 
stolen cultural objects”55 and 
the “return of illegally exported 
cultural objects.”56 UNIDROIT 
itself works to “reconcile the 
rights of good faith purchasers 
in art-purchasing nations and the 
need for protection of archaeo-
logical resources in artifact-rich 
nations.”57 It seeks to accom-
plish this goal by “encouraging 
artifact-rich nations to maintain 
catalogues of national collec-
tions, developing ties of friend-
ship and cooperation among 
museums in different countries, 
working toward greater inter-
national recognition of national 
cultural property laws, and 
issuing a kind of identity card for 
documented cultural objects.”58
The UNIDROIT Convention sets out guidelines for 
enforcement, specifying that the claim must be international in 
character.59 It clearly states, “The possessor of a cultural object 
which has been stolen shall return it.”60 Cultural objects are 
defined as, “those which, on religious or secular grounds, are 
of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, 
art or science and belong to one of the categories listed in the 
Annex to this Convention.”61 This, obviously, is a much broader 
category than the “archaeological or ethnological” specification 
in the CPIA.62 Under the UNIDROIT Convention, “[c]laims 
must be made within three years from the time the claimant 
discovers the location of the object and the identity of the pos-
sessor; however, all claims must be filed within fifty years of the 
time of the theft.”63 Like the CPIA, the UNIDROIT Convention 
also contains a good faith provision, wherein the claimant must 
provide reasonable compensation for the item if it was acquired 
in good faith.64 Additionally, the UNIDROIT Convention 
provides for the return of illegally exported cultural property, 
The CPIA has its shortcomings. 
For example, the requirement 
that a state party would have 
to pay the possessor fair 
compensation if the article  
is acquired in good faith may 
put a strain on countries with 
small economies that cannot 
spare the funds to recover  
their cultural heritage.
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though it must do so through a court or similarly competent 
authority in the state where the property is held.65 In particular, 
the possessor automatically defaults and must forfeit the item 
if there is no export permit (a sure sign that the item was 
purchased through the black market).66
The UNIDROIT Convention is also not a perfect solution 
for the U.S. Perhaps the biggest problem domestically is that 
it carries no force in the United States.67 While the CPIA does 
offer several similar provisions, UNIDROIT provides more 
leeway for the claimant68 and does not specify that the object 
must be older than two hundred and fifty years old,69 and 
therefore can be considered more in line with the goals of the 
UNESCO Convention. Additionally, while the CPIA limits the 
cultural objects to those of “archaeological or ethnological” 
significance,70 the UNIDROIT Convention has a much broader 
spectrum of protected items.71 The CPIA, then, creates even 
more of a limit on culturally significant items, exempting such 
items as antiquities between a century and two hundred and fifty 
years old and certain property relating to history. However, the 
UNIDROIT Convention does not apply when “the export of 
a cultural object is no longer illegal at the time at which the 
return is requested or the object was exported during the life-
time of the person who created it or within a period of fifty years 
following the death of that person.”72 Ideally, in such a circum-
stance, domestic criminal law standards will apply; though the 
UNIDROIT Convention does not provide any clarity. As the 
UNIDROIT Convention is not in full force in the U.S., it merely 
serves as a guidepost and a possible affecter of domestic law.
B. THE NSPA—CRIMINALIZING AN  
 INTERNATIONAL OFFENSE
The NSPA73 is the major basis for criminal prosecution 
of cultural property theft in the United States. It was passed 
in 1934 as an extension of the National Motor Vehicle Act of 
1919.74 Section 2314 provides for prosecution of “[w]hoever 
transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign com-
merce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of 
the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been 
stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”75 Section 2315 provides 
for prosecution of:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, 
sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise, 
securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more, 
or pledges or accepts as security for a loan any goods, 
wares, or merchandise, or securities, of the value  
of $500 or more, which have crossed a State or 
United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully  
converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been 
stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken.76
Taken with the CPIA, the NSPA could be the standard by 
which patrimony claims are resolved and the international black 
market in antiquities shut down in the United States. To date, 
the NSPA has been the basis for almost all international art theft 
prosecutions in the United States.77
Yet the U.S. has repeatedly encountered problems in 
attempting to prosecute art thieves through the NSPA.78 In 
particular, since the NSPA is a criminal statute, prosecutors 
must prove the “scienter” element to the crime, that is, the 
element of intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.79
Proving scienter is especially difficult due to the very 
nature of black markets themselves. From finder to possessor, 
the stolen item can pass through numerous hands, including 
very discreet dealers and auction houses.80 The lack of proce-
dural safeguards, or in many cases, the intentional disregard 
of those safeguards, leads to an inability to show “a legitimate 
chain of title,” and the final purchaser is not always aware of the 
illegal nature of the item he or she has acquired.81 Despite this 
setback, the NSPA has provided the basis for numerous claims 
and the evolution of domestic criminal law towards prosecuting 
individuals for the international crime of art theft.82
III. GAME CHANGE—HOW SCHULTZ CREATED  
A NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The NSPA and CPIA together spawned a line of cases that 
applied domestic criminal law to international offenses.83 Due to 
the difficulty of establishing that an object is stolen, prosecutors 
have become adept at finding clever methods of bringing forth 
a successful case against a defendant, a la Al Capone.84 This 
Part examines what led up to seminal case of United States v. 
Schultz,85 the impact of Schultz, and briefly examines alternative 
methods employed by the U.S. government to prosecute art theft.
A. THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE
With the UNESCO Convention came a change in U.S. 
attitude towards stolen cultural property. No longer were 
provenance claims swept under the rug and patrimony claims 
ignored. In 1970, the U.S. realized that these crimes were of vast 
significance, in no small part due to an effort by archaeologists 
to preserve their dig sites which were long subject to looting.86 
As a result, a pair of cases87 emerged in the 1970s that would set 
the standard for applying the NSPA to cases of stolen cultural 
property going forward.
The first such case is United States v. Hollinshead.88 
Hollinshead, an antiquities dealer specializing in pre-Colum-
bian artifacts, financed a co-conspirator, Aramilla, to procure 
such artifacts.89 The case particularly concerned one item, the 
Machaquila Stele 2, worth several thousand dollars.90 The stele 
was “found in a Mayan ruin in . . . Guatemala, cut into pieces,” 
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brought to a man named Fell’s fish packing plant in Belize, 
then marked as the “personal effects” to Hollinshead in Santa 
Fe Springs, California.91 The stele traveled around the United 
States, settling in California with Hollinshead before he was 
arrested.92 Overwhelming evidence showed that the defendants 
knew it was illegal to remove the stele from Guatemala under 
Guatemalan law, and further knew the stele was stolen.93 The 
Ninth Circuit dismissed eight of the claims raised on appeal 
regarding evidentiary matters as lacking merit.94 However, the 
court chose to examine the claim “that the court erroneously 
instructed the jury that there is a presumption that every person 
knows what the law forbids.”95 The district court judge defined 
the word “stolen” as used in Section 2314 of the NSPA96 in his 
jury instructions as “acquired, or possessed, as a result of some 
wrongful or dishonest act or taking, whereby a person willfully 
obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to 
another, without or beyond any permission given, and with 
the intent to deprive the owner of the benefit of ownership.”97 
While there was no objection at that time to the definition, there 
was an objection to the later jury instruction at question in this 
case.98 Noting that the law in question was U.S. law, the govern-
ment only needed to prove that the defendants knew the stele 
was stolen,99 not from where it was stolen.100 The court then 
drew the conclusion that the government did not need to prove 
“the law of the place of theft,” reasoning Guatemalan law would 
only bear on this case insofar as the defendants’ knowledge the 
stele was stolen.101 The court stated that the jury instruction may 
have been in error, but not to a prejudicial extent.102 By proving 
the defendants “brib[ed] officials and us[ed] false marks on 
the stele’s packaging to smuggle it into the United States,” the 
government established beyond a reasonable doubt that they 
knew the stele was stolen and they were smuggling it into the 
U.S. in violation of the NSPA.103
The second case involving the NSPA was United States 
v. McClain.104 More so than Hollinshead, McClain was poised 
to send a real message to the art dealing community, holding 
profound implications for art dealers, who were never before 
criminally liable for their actions.105 The defendants were 
“convicted by a jury of conspiring to transport, receive, and 
sell stolen pre-Columbian artifacts” in violation of the NSPA.106 
Joseph M. Rodriguez, one of the defendants, approached Adalina 
Zambrano of the Mexican Cultural Institute in San Antonio, 
Texas with a proposal to sell her various pre-Columbian 
artifacts.107 Unfortunately for Rodriguez, the Institute was 
an official part of the Mexican government, thus presumably 
sealing the case against him for illegal importation.108 The other 
four defendants were implicated in similar cases of attempting 
to sell stolen pre-Columbian artifacts.109 The defendants did not 
deny they knew the objects were illegally imported, but claimed 
that because Mexico did not truly lay claim to all objects of 
cultural significance within its borders, found or unfound, until 
1972, they could rightfully claim ownership of the items.110 The 
contested jury instruction, which formed the basis for the Fifth 
Circuit’s reversal, read that:
[S]ince 1897 Mexican law has declared pre-Columbian  
artifacts recovered from the Republic of Mexico 
within its borders to be the property of the Republic 
of Mexico, except in instances where the Government 
of the Republic of Mexico has, by way of license or 
permit, granted permission to private persons or parties 
or others to receive and export in their possession such 
artifacts to other places or other countries.111
The court first recognized that Mexico has a similar right 
to make a claim under the NSPA as any state in the U.S.112 The 
court then examined, as it did in Hollinshead, the trial judge’s 
use of the word stolen in his jury instructions.113 The court spent 
some time on this discussion before finally rejecting the defen-
dants’ argument that property owned by a foreign government, 
yet also capable of being privately owned through purchase or 
discovery, is not stolen for the purposes of the NSPA.114 The 
court evaluated the 1897 Mexican Law on Archaeological 
Monuments, and found nothing to constitute a declaration of 
ownership by the state.115 Similarly, it stated that the Mexican 
1930 Law on the Protection and Conservation of Monuments 
and Natural Beauty “implicitly recognized the right to private 
ownership of monuments and expressly allowed monuments to 
be freely alienated, subject to the government’s right of first 
refusal.”116 The court found that both the 1934 and 1970 laws 
allowed for private ownership of movables, even if they were 
of cultural value.117 The 1972 law was the first instance the 
court found where the Mexican government asserted its rights 
to the cultural property in its borders.118 Thus, the court held that 
“a declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal 
exportation of an article can be considered theft, and the 
exported article ‘stolen,’ within the meaning of the [NSPA].”119 
The court went on to hold that “the state’s power to regulate 
is not ownership.”120 Applying the court’s logic, the following 
conditions show the item was stolen: (i) if the export was after 
1972, the artifact may have been stolen (if it was “not legiti-
mately in the seller’s hands as a result of prior law”); (ii) if the 
export was before 1972 but after 1934, then one would need 
to show it “was found on or in an immovable archaeological 
monument;” and (iii) if the export was before 1934, then the 
object was not the property of the Mexican government, and 
so illegal exportation would subject the receiver to prosecution 
under the NSPA.121 Since the jury was not informed, it had 
to determine when the objects were exported, then apply the 
relevant Mexican law, the convictions were reversed, and the 
case remanded.122 Ultimately, McClain is about the distinction 
between “stolen” and “illegally exported” goods, which is the 
difference between a criminal and civil penalty.123
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Hollinshead and McClain were not without their critics. 
Some argued that the U.S. had improperly enforced the penal 
laws and export regulations of other states.124 Just as significantly, 
many detractors feared the decisions would bolster the black 
markets in art-purchasing nations.125 Additionally, some were 
troubled by the application of the NSPA to cultural property 
theft in foreign countries,126 
though as the McClain court 
stated, “[I]t is not ‘unfair to 
require that one who delib-
erately goes perilously close 
to an area of proscribed con-
duct shall take the risk that 
he may cross the line.’”127 
If Hollinshead and McClain 
were controversial decisions, 
Schultz would blow them out 
of the water.
B. THE CURIOUS CASE OF UNITED STATES  
 V. SCHULTZ
United States v. Schultz is the game changing moment in 
domestic case law, providing for the criminal prosecution of an 
art dealer, Frederick Schultz, who was “indicted on one count 
for conspiracy to receive stolen Egyptian antiquities that had 
been transported in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371” conspiracy to 
commit offense or defraud the United States.128 Schultz argued 
that the items he allegedly conspired to receive could not be 
stolen, as they were not owned by anybody.129 The prosecution 
countered that the Egyptian government’s patrimony law, Law 
117, “declared all antiquities found in Egypt after 1983 to be the 
property of the Egyptian government.130
Jonathan Tokeley Parry, a British national, showed 
Schultz a photo of “an ancient sculpture of the head of Pharaoh 
Amenhotep III,” and claimed he obtained the sculpture in Egypt 
from a building contractor via a middleman, Ali Farag.131 To 
smuggle the sculpture out of Egypt, Parry coated it with plas-
tic to make it appear like a cheap souvenir, then removed the 
plastic in England.132 Schultz offered Parry a large amount of 
money to be the agent in the sale of the sculpture, which Parry 
agreed to, and the two subsequently established a false prove-
nance for the item to better sell it.133 When the men were unable 
to find a buyer, Schultz purchased the sculpture for $800,000, 
and later sold it to a private collector for $1.2 million.134 By mid-
1995, Robin Symes had acquired the sculpture and requested 
that Schultz provide him with further details as to the sculpture’s 
origin, as the Egyptian government was pursuing it.135
Using the same method as with the Amenhotep sculpture, 
Parry and Schultz smuggled more items out of Egypt; they did 
this at least five more times from 1991-92, “under the false 
provenance of the Thomas Alcock Collection.”136 In June 1994, 
both Parry and Farag were arrested in Great Britain and Egypt, 
respectively, for dealing in stolen antiquities.137 Though Parry 
was in custody, he and Schultz continued to talk, discussing 
the purchase and resale of ten limestone stele (inscribed 
slabs), though neither obtained them.138 The court found Parry 
and Schultz’s communications to be evidence that they were 
aware of the legal risk of their 
actions; the couple employed 
“‘veiled terms,’ code, or lan-
guages other than English” 
in their letters.139 Schultz was 
found guilty on the sole count 
and was sentenced to thirty-
three months imprisonment on 
June 11, 2002.140 Interestingly, 
one can see the split in ideol-
ogy between dealers/collectors 
and archaeologists/preservationists in the series of amicus curiae 
briefs submitted to the court.141
The first major issue the court tackled was the application 
of the NSPA to cases implicating patrimony laws.142 Law 117, 
Egypt’s patrimony law, enacted in 1983, required the registration 
and recording of all privately owned antiquities in Egypt, 
prohibited their removal from Egypt, and made the private 
ownership or possession of antiquities after 1983 illegal.143 
Parry and Schultz’s scheme involved buying “newly unearthed 
antiquities at black market prices from tomb-raiders, building 
contractors, and corrupt Egyptian officials.”144 Law 117 attached 
criminal penalties to smuggling, theft, removal, counterfeiting, 
unlawful dispossession, and defacement of antiquities.145 The 
Second Circuit flatly rejected Schultz’s argument that Law 117 
did not create an ownership right.146 The court stated that Law 
117 is directed towards both “activities within Egypt as well as 
the export of antiquities out of Egypt.”147 Though the Second 
Circuit believed Schultz violated Egyptian law, it still needed 
to determine whether Schultz violated the NSPA.148 The court 
noted that the nationality of the owner of the stolen property has 
no impact under the NSPA.149 Furthermore, the court cited its 
own argument in United States v. Benson,150 which applied the 
NSPA to cases where the person from whom the property was 
stolen may not have been the true owner as the victim’s title 
in the property may be irrelevant.151 Schultz persisted on 
rejecting the Egyptian government’s ownership claim by reject-
ing the holding in McClain and conflicting with U.S. policy, 
with the CPIA, and the common law definition of “stolen.”152 
The court, in turn, agreed that the Fifth Circuit “found the proper 
balancing tests between” “stolen” and “illegally exported.”153 
The court found that U.S. policy was irrelevant here as Law 
117 is a true ownership law,154 and cited the Senate Report on 
the CPIA for support of its finding that the law functions as a 
corollary to existing federal and state remedies, including theft 
If Hollinshead and McClain were 
controversial decisions, Schultz 
would blow them out of the water.
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and smuggling laws.155 Additionally, the court found Schultz’s 
arguments concerning the common law definition of “stolen” to 
be unpersuasive.156 Schultz raised an additional argument con-
cerning mistake of U.S. law, as he was unaware that violations 
of Law 117 were subject to criminal penalties domestically 
under the NSPA, the court rejected his reasoning, noting that the 
NSPA does not include the term “willfully,” and only requires 
knowledge that the goods were “stolen, unlawfully converted, 
or taken.”157 Schultz raised two additional claims: 1) regarding 
the “conscious avoidance” jury instruction,158 and 2) the admit-
tance of evidence by the state concerning other individuals’ 
in the antiquities trade’s personal knowledge of the Law 117 
(including his former assistant).159 The former was rejected as 
the instruction was accurate enough, and the latter was rejected 
on the grounds that the testimony was relevant.160
The primary holding from Schultz was that “the NSPA 
applies to property that is stolen from a foreign government, 
where that government asserts actual ownership of the property 
pursuant to a valid patrimony law.”161 Furthermore, Schultz 
established what had long been suspected in the American legal 
system: the CPIA and the NSPA are not mutually exclusive.162 In 
the aftermath of Schultz, museums began to change their attitudes 
towards looted antiquities.163 The rule denying deliberate avoid-
ance, a tactic long used by art dealers to trade items on the black 
market, also changed the game; now provenance would have to 
be established for a museum or collector to feel comfortable in its 
acquisition. Provenance was more clearly established and many 
museums voluntarily repatriated artifacts they found to be looted. 
The NSPA is not the only vehicle for criminal prosecution, how-
ever, and individuals who have attempted to get around it have 
found themselves subject to prosecution by more creative means.
C. CLEVERNESS—ALTERNATIVE ROUTES  
 TO PROSECUTION
While the NSPA provided the prosecutorial grounds for 
the majority of stolen art cases in the United States, including 
Schultz, this was not the only means to prosecution. This Part 
briefly discusses some of the alternate methods used to obtain a 
conviction in an international art theft case.
Since the NSPA applies to archaeological artifacts stolen 
from “nations with statutes vesting ownership of the objects 
in the state,” it would not apply to a bona fide purchaser of 
the objects, who bought them in good faith, trusting their prov-
enance.164 Sometimes the prosecutor can bring a case under the 
NSPA when the scienter is less clear, such as in the case of 
Joe T. Meador, a soldier during World War II who stole the 
Quedlinburg treasures after the war and brought them home to 
Texas.165 After he died, the German government discovered the 
family was trying to sell the treasures, and rather than pursue 
the prosecution, requested the U.S. government drop the case 
and instead reached a settlement for $2.75 million.166 Another 
case, Peru v. Johnson,167 showed the difficulty of establishing 
that artifacts were illegally excavated.168 The case placed on 
the claimant a difficult standard of proof—that of the object’s 
geographical origin—and may be the reason claimants found it 
so difficult to bring an NSPA case after McClain until Schultz.169 
However, in light of this limitation, the U.S. uses other means 
to prosecute art thieves; mail and wire fraud statutes, for 
example, were used in Center Art Galleries-Hawaii Inc. v. 
United States.170 In Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co.,171 
a combination of individuals and corporation were held to 
be in violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) by misrepresenting the value 
of art plates in order to sell them.172 Finally, in United States 
v. Clack,173 the court convicted and fined the defendant 
$1,008,000 under both the NSPA and the Hobbs Act for “a 
series of burglaries and robberies of antique art, paintings, 
Oriental rugs, and jewelry.”174
These cases show that while the NSPA was difficult to 
enforce in cases of art theft, it was still possible to use domestic 
statutes to obtain a conviction of forgers, defrauders, and 
thieves. Schultz reaffirmed the right of foreign states to their 
own cultural property. While this began the move towards 
fixing the inherent problems in the art trade, it would take 
one more case for the message to sink in.
IV. AMERICAN OUTLAWS—THE GETTY’S  
GAME WITH THE BLACK MARKET
The period from 1970 to 2003 saw a gradual shift in 
attitude towards recognizing patrimony claims and the need to 
establish provenance. The threat of criminal prosecution for 
international art theft hung heavily over the heads of dealers, 
museum directors, and private collectors. On the other side, 
archaeologists, researchers, and states cheered as they saw 
a victory in Schultz, a step towards ridding them of the plague 
of theft and destruction of their archaeological digs.
This was clearly not the end of the black market, however. 
Old guard American museums such as the Met and the Getty 
were loath to part with artifacts in their collections, whether or 
not the patrimony claims were legitimate.175 This Section briefly 
examines the importation of stolen art to the Getty, as well as 
the subsequent trial of Marion True and its impact on the nature 
of museum acquisitions today. This Section relies entirely on 
the account of the case by Jason Felch and Ralph Frammolino 
in their book, Chasing Aphrodite,176 as it is arguably the best 
and only authoritative source in English on this particular case.
A. CRIME
The J. Paul Getty Museum in Malibu, California was 
initially conceived as a tax shelter for J. Paul Getty; a place 
62 Spring 2012
to store his art collection and receive a sizeable tax deduction 
in return.177 The acquisition of art as a tax incentive later came 
back to haunt the Getty, but at that time, the collection was 
barely open to the public.178 After Getty’s death, he left the 
museum nearly $700 million in Getty Oil stock, which rapidly 
transformed the collection from the tax break of an oilman to 
“the richest art institution in the world.”179 The endowment in 
turn led to the Getty’s first questionable acquisition, a bronze 
statue of an athlete later named “the Getty Bronze.”180
The Getty, now the richest art museum, was also arguably 
the most entrenched museum in the illegal art trade.181 Former 
antiquities curator, Jiri Frel, used the museum as a tax shelter for 
the Hollywood elite, establishing a scheme whereby he would 
have the rich and famous buy antiquities of all manner, including 
shards and smaller items, for a relatively low cost from a 
dealer.182 He would then inflate the value of the item through 
his appraisal (initially by actual treatment and restoration of the 
item, later by the simple stroke of a pen) and had the owner 
donate the item to the museum for a massive tax write-off.183 
These acquisitions, however, were not the source of the Getty’s 
ultimate troubles; those were the result of Marion True’s actions 
during her stint as antiquities curator.184
In 1986, True began a business relationship with Robin 
Symes, a dealer, who introduced her to the source of True’s 
downfall, a cult statue from a Greek temple, likely Aphrodite, 
at the cost of $24 million.185 Meanwhile, True and John Walsh, 
the director of the Getty, drafted a memo stating, “We believe 
we should go beyond what is demanded by the law . . . and 
abide by the highest possible ethical standards in our collection 
policy.”186 The Aphrodite had a highly suspect provenance187 
and though the Getty requested information about the statue, 
the purchase was authorized a week before the Italian Ministry 
of Culture reported it had no information about the statue.188 
However, upon debuting the statue and receiving criticism from 
the Italian government, the Getty stated that it would return the 
statue if the Italians could mount a credible claim.189 Further 
acquisitions were made of similar questionable provenance, yet 
by 1998, Marion True had emerged as a beacon of museum 
reform, calling for an end to the justifications for acquiring 
looted antiquities.190 Meanwhile, the Italian police launched 
an investigation through the art squad of the Carabinieri, lead-
ing to the arrest of the dealer Giacomo Medici and in October 
1999, a request for strict import quotas brought via the CPIA.191 
In her testimony in the CPIA hearing, True said that the 
“suggestions of some that it was better to have illicit antiquities 
on well-tended American shelves than to let the careless Italians 
keep them in dusty exhibits” was improper. American museums 
were equally careless.192 However, the contents of Medici’s 
warehouse were shipped to the Italian art police, which led to a 
rather devastating deposition of True.193 This would prove to be 
the beginning of the end.
B. PUNISHMENT
The ruling in Schultz changed the face of museum 
acquisitions and made very real the threat of domestic criminal 
prosecution. Yet the Italian police wanted to fully impress upon 
American museums the consequences of illegal acquisitions, 
and end the practice once and for all.194 Through the 2002 arrest 
of art dealer, Frieda Tchakos, the investigators learned about 
the donation of several looted items to the Getty, effectively a 
laundering scheme on par with Frel’s.195 The Italians established 
a case against Medici, True, and another art dealer they both 
worked with, Robert Hecht.196
Medici’s trial began in December 2003; it was severed from 
the trials of his alleged co-conspirators.197 Medici was found 
guilty in December 2004 for antiquities trafficking of objects 
looted from Italy.198 Though True’s preliminary hearing took 
a year and a half, she was ultimately indicted for trafficking 
looted antiquities on April 1, 2005 and ordered to stand trial in 
Rome.199 The Getty announced her “retirement” on October 1, 
2005.200 By 2007, the Getty returned forty-six artifacts including 
the Aphrodite (though not the Getty Bronze), purchased over 
thirty years, worth nearly $40 million dollars.201 Meanwhile, 
True had been protesting her innocence, but it was too late.202 
The criminal case in Italy continued; however, the prosecutor 
stated he had no intention of putting her in jail, and offered a 
speedy conclusion provided True admit her wrongdoing.203 She 
was simultaneously facing a criminal trial in Greece time for 
similar charges, though the Greek government dropped the case 
after the statute of limitations expired in November 2007.204 
True’s criminal trial in Italy was finally dismissed without 
verdict in October 2010, when the statute of limitations expired 
on those criminal charges.205
The trial of Marion True in a foreign court was the final 
straw that broke down the old guard and led to a new wave 
of museum acquisitions. The Italian prosecutor stated that 
“[h]is goal had been to change the behavior of American 
museums, and that battle had been won . . . . Marion True 
had been collateral damage, a means to an end.”206 This rather 
drastic outcome did, however, lead to the steady repatriation of 
cultural artifacts from museums in the U.S. to Italy and Greece, 
which culminated, in the Getty’s case, with the shipment of the 
Aphrodite—which may not have been Aphrodite at all207—back 
to Italy in December 2010 where it remains in a museum outside 
the ruins of Morgantina, where it was first stolen.208
V. CONCLUSION
The world of antiquities acquisitions has changed. Art theft 
has by no means diminished;209 however, now it has a dimin-
ished role in the United States.210 While some have protested 
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this cultural shift,211 it has largely been accepted by American 
museums.212 The combination of the NSPA, the CPIA, Schultz, 
and the trial of Marion True have sent the sternest possible mes-
sage to museums, dealers, and private collectors of antiquities 
in the U.S.: art theft is not tolerated in this country. The black 
market in looted treasures will persist, as it always has, but 
for now, the major museums in the U.S. are backing away 
and choosing instead to display valuable artifacts from other 
countries via long-term loans.
Of course, the U.S. is not the only major art-purchasing 
nation. The U.K., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, 
Canada, and China all have purchased objects of questionable 
provenance, or otherwise acquired them through looting in 
imperial times.213 The change in the U.S. is important; it shows 
that Americans are capable of respecting the international 
community and its history. However, this does not change the 
controversy over the Elgin marbles, still in the British Museum, 
or the hundreds of sculptures in the Louvre still subject to 
patrimony claims. While domestic criminal law has worked in 
the United States by punishing offenders and recognizing the 
problem of stolen art, selling stolen artifacts on the black market 
remains as good a source of income today as it was for the crew 
of the Ferrucio Ferri when they discovered the Getty Bronze. 
Hope can be found in the words of J. Paul Getty,
To me my works of art are all vividly alive. They’re 
the embodiment of whoever created them—a mirror of 
their creator’s hopes, dreams and frustrations….They 
have led eventful lives—pampered by the aristocracy 
and pillaged by revolution, courted with ardour and 
cold-bloodedly abandoned. They have been honored 
by drawing rooms and humbled by attics. So many 
worlds in their lifespan, yet all were transitory. What 
stories they could tell, what sights they must have 
seen! Their worlds have long since disintegrated, yet 
they live on.214
By preserving provenance, we preserve our shared history, 
keeping the story true and giving these precious and historic 
works of art new life, a more priceless undertaking than profit. 
The black market in looted antiquities will continue until such 
a time as both art-purchasing and especially art-rich countries 
recognize their shared responsibility in protecting the world’s 
cultural heritage from the dangers of looting, and preserve 
them for posterity so that future generations can understand 
their history.
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magiC flUte) (EMI Classics 1950) (1788).
49 § 2601(2)(C)(ii).
50 See generally Coggins, Archeology, supra note 4, at 264 (addressing 
the pillaging of native artifacts from pre-Columbian cultures).
51 See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the NSPA, which allows for 
criminal prosecution in stolen property cases).
52 See e.g., European Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural 
Property, June 23, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 44, 45 (1986) (addressing the need 
to protect cultural property and provide a means of restitution for stolen 
cultural property).
53 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 450, 517 (requiring the preservation of all archaeological 
and historical artifacts found in the sea).
54 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 26, at 1331. UNIDROIT drafted 
this convention in response to a request by UNESCO to harmonize member 
states’ cultural property laws. See Flynn, supra note 32, at 106-07 (describing 
the events leading up to the Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects in 1995).
55 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 25, at 1331-32 (detailing the 
process of restitution and setting forth the responsibilities of the illegal 
possessor as well as the rights of the aggrieved party).
56 Id. at 1332-34 (detailing how a State may request the return of stolen 
cultural property).
57 Borodkin, supra note 1, at 390.
58 Id.
59 See discussion supra Part I.A.3 (noting that the UNIDROIT Convention 
applies to international claim).
60 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 25, at 1331 (reinforcing the 
emphasis the Convention placed on ensuring the restitution of stolen 
cultural objects).
61 Id. (defining the scope of application).
62 See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the use of the terms 
“archaeological and ethnological” in the CPIA).
63 Flynn, supra note 31, at 107 (explaining that “the Convention applies 
the discovery rule to the tolling of the statute of limitations.”). There is an 
exception when the item has been removed from an identified monument 
or archaeological site, or belongs to a public collection. Id.
64 See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 25, at 1333 (explaining that for 
compensation to be paid the “possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably 
to have known . . . that the object had been illegally exported.”).
65 Flynn, supra note 31, at 108 (explaining that a State may request the 
return of cultural property even if it was not actually stolen).
66 See id. (noting that the lack of a permit erodes the defendant’s claim of 
lack of notice as to the legality of the item’s exportation).
67 See Claudia Fox, Note, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade 
in Cultural Property, 9 am. U. J. int’l l. & Pol’y 225, 250 (1993) (discussing 
how parent legislation to the UNIDROIT Convention in the United States 
restricted imports and emergency application of the Convention).
68 See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 25, at 1332 (stating that “[t]
he possessor shall not be in a more favourable position than the person 
from whom it acquired the cultural object by inheritance or otherwise 
gratuitously.”).
69 See supra note 48 (discussing the practical effect of the age cutoff 
in the CPIA).
70 See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the use of the terms 
“archaeological and ethnological” in the CPIA).
71 The UNIDROIT Convention covers the same items as the UNESCO 
Convention. See generally sources cited supra notes 24-25 (discussing the 
prohibition of illegally importing or stolen cultural objects and providing 
for the return of such objects to their home state).
72 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 25, at 1334 (setting forth the 
general exceptions of the chapter). But see id. (declining to apply the provision 
exempting “export during the lifetime of the [creator] or within a period of 
fifty years following” that person’s death when the “cultural object was made 
by a member or members of a tribal or indigenous community for traditional 
or ritual use by that community” and ensuring the object’s return in that 
circumstance).
73 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (2006).
74 See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal 
Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 vand. J. transnat’l l. 1199, 1206 
(2005) (discussing the history of the NSPA).
75 See § 2314 (providing a fine and/or imprisonment for no more than ten 
years for someone found guilty of violating the section).
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76 See § 2315 (providing a fine and/or imprisonment for no more than ten 
years for someone found guilty of violating the section).
77 See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1206 (discussing the bases of prosecution 
for international art theft in the United States).
78 See Eisen, supra note 22, at 1068 n.14 (explaining that the lack of 
success is due in part because the property must fall within the United 
States’ narrow definition of the word stolen).
79 Kreder, supra note 74, at 1206 (noting that the government must show 
that the violation was intentional).
80 See id. at 1207 (noting that “dealers and auction houses take very few 
measures to verify the provenance of the artwork.”) (quoting Claudia Fox, 
Note, The UNDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural 
Property, 9 am. U. J. int’l l. & Pol’y 225, 233 (1993)).
81 Id. See generally felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 17-25 (discussing 
the acquisition of numerous pieces by the Getty through often questionable 
provenance claims, ultimately leading to the prosecution of Marion True 
in Italy).
82 See e.g., United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 
1974) (applying the NSPA to the transportation of stolen goods from Central 
America to the United States); United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 409 
(2d Cir. 2003) (clarifying the roles of the NSPA and CPIA in domestic 
enforcement of cultural property patrimony claims in a criminal theft claim).
83 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409.
84 See Borodkin, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that “[f]ederal mail fraud, 
wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax fraud provisions, as well as unifying 
criminal conspiracy laws have occasionally been employed in the art context.”).
85 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 410 (concluding that NSPA “applies to property 
that is stolen in violation of a foreign patrimony law” and that “CPIA is not 
the exclusive means of dealing with stolen artifacts and antiquities.”).
86 See Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 
art JoUrnal 94, 94 (1969) (noting the destruction of digs and cultural sites 
in Guatemala and Mexico as part of the quest for fuel to feed the art market).
87 United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing 
defendants’ conviction for conspiracy to violate the NSPA).
88 Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1154.
89 Id. at 1155.
90 Id. (noting that the stele was a very rare item).
91 See id. (describing the use of bribes to Guatemalan officers to ensure 
the package was exported without any hassle).
92 See id. (noting that Fell and Dwyer, another conspirator, stele traveled from 
“Decatur, Georgia, to New York City, to Wisconsin and to Raleigh, North 
Carolina” before winding up with Hollinshead, who attempted to sell it).
93 See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 
1974) (noting that “[i]t would have been astonishing if the jury had found 
that they did not know the stele was stolen.”).
94 Id. at 1155 (dismissing claims relating to the sufficiency of the 
evidence).
95 Id.
96 See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006) (concerning transportation of stolen 
items).
97 Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1156 (quoting the judge’s jury instruction).
98 Id. (objecting to the instruction that the jury “must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellants knew the stele was stolen).
99 See id. (citing McAbee v. United States, 434 F.2d 361, 362 (9th Cir. 
1970)).
100 See id. (citing Pugliano v. United States, 348 F.2d 902, 903 (1st Cir. 
1965)).
101 Id.
102 United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting 
that the court felt it was unlikely the jury questioned the instruction insofar 
as it referenced Guatemalan law).
103 Kreder, supra note 74, at 1208. Interestingly, this case began as a civil 
suit brought by the Guatemalan government, which was dropped when the 
U.S. attorney began criminal proceedings. Id.
104 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
105 The amicus curiae brief from the American Association of Dealers in 
Ancient, Oriental, and Primitive Art stated that “merely by dealing in art 
work that have originated albeit many years earlier in countries whose laws 
include broad declarations of national ownership in art, [dealers] will be open 
to charges of receiving and transporting stolen property in violation of federal 
criminal law.” McClain, 545 F.2d at 991. While the brief also argued for the 
public’s right to view art in the United States, clearly the bigger fear was 
criminal prosecution of dealers, museum directors, and private collectors for 
failing to establish the provenance of works in their collections. Id.
106 McClain, 545 F.2d at 992.
107 Id. at 992-93.
108 See id. at 993 (stating that Zambrano was able to identify through 
photographs several of the items Rodriguez had shown her).
109 See id. (stating defendants Simpson and Bradshaw attempted to sell 
artifacts they knew were stolen to McGauley and an informer).
110 See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(discussing Dr. Gertz’s testimony that Mexico’s laws have protected 
its cultural heritage since 1897, including registration and export permit 
requirements established in 1934, through which only fifty to seventy 
permits have been issued. The defendants did not register their artifacts or 
obtain export permits).
111 Id. at 994.
112 See id. (noting that 18 U.S.C.§§ 2314, 2315 (2006) refer to both 
interstate commerce and foreign commerce).
113 See id. at 993-94 (“[S]tolen means acquired or possessed as a result 
of some wrongful or dishonest act of taking, whereby a person willfully 
obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to another, without 
or beyond any permission given, and with the intent to deprive the benefits 
of ownership and use.”).
114 See id. at 997 (“[W]e cannot say that the intent of any statute, treaty, 
or general policy of encouraging the importation of art more than 100 
years old was to narrow the National Stolen Property Act so as to make it 
inapplicable to art objects or artifacts declared to be the property of another 
country and illegally imported into this country.”).
115 See id. at 997-98 (noting that the l897 law did intend to declare archaeo-
logical monuments were property of the state but distinguished antiquities 
and other movable objects).
116 See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(describing that nothing in the 1930 law contained a declaration of ownership 
by the government).
117 See id. at 998-99 (explaining that governmental ownership was limited 
to “artifacts found in or on immovable monuments”).
118 See id. at 1000 (noting that only after the effective date of the 1972 
law would the Mexican government have had ownership of the artifacts in 
question).
119 Id. at 1000-01. Notably, the court argues,
If . . . an object were considered ‘stolen’ merely because it was illegally 
exported, the meaning of the term ‘stolen’ would be stretched beyond its 
conventional meaning. Although ‘stealing’ is not a term of art, it is also 
not a word bereft of meaning. It should not be expanded at the govern-
ment’s will beyond the connotation—depriving an owner of its rights in 
property—conventionally called to mind.
Id. at 1002. This is a fine point to make, though not one without meaning, as 
it effectively separates the customs violation of illegal export with outright 
theft, as someone could theoretically violate a country’s export laws while 
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maintaining full title to the property that was exported. Essentially, the 
court is trying to distinguish between ownership and possession to ensure 
that criminal penalties are not imposed when they are not required. United 
States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977).
120 Id. at 1002.
121 Id. at 1003 (providing a summary of the court’s conclusions).
122 See id. (noting that the jury was the only body who could properly 
determine when the object was exported; holding otherwise would violate 
the defendants’ right to a trial by jury).
123 Contra Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 
stan. l. rev. 275, 350-51 (1982) (arguing that McClain erodes the distinc-
tion between “stolen” and “illegally exported.” Bator states, “A blanket 
legislative declaration of state ownership of all antiquities, discovered and 
undiscovered, without more, is an abstraction—it makes little difference in 
the real world. Yet McClain gives this abstraction dramatic weight: Illegal 
export, after the adoption of the declaration, suddenly becomes ‘theft.’ 
The exporting country, without affecting any real changes at home, can 
thus invoke the criminal legislation of the United States to help enforce 
its export rules by simply waving a magic wand and promulgating this 
meta-physical declaration of ownership.”).
124 See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1211 (noting some of the criticism of 
the Hollinshead and McClain decisions).
125 See id. at 1212 (stating that enforcement of “foreign law criminalizing 
the export of any and all artifacts, rather than . . . a narrower class of 
objects, would generate a black market in ‘art hungry’ nations.”); see also 
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 
1999) (stating that McClain adopted a broad definition of property under 
the NSPA, but declining to address the issue).
126 See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1212 (noting that many believed the 
NSPA to apply to domestic organized crime among the several states, 
rather than international crime).
127 See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d, 988, 1002 n.30 (citing Boyce 
Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952)).
128 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the 
underlying offense was a violation of the NSPA under 18 U.S.C. § 2315).





133 See id. (noting the culprits claimed one of Parry’s relatives brought the 
sculpture from Egypt in the 1920s and kept it in a private collection, the 
“Thomas Alcock Collection,” since that time).
134 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 2003)
135 See id. (noting that Schultz requested information on the Egyptian 
claim, but did not provide additional information on the sculpture’s 
provenance).
136 Id. at 396. Some of the items brought out of Egypt may have been fakes, 
including a sculpture of Meryet Anum, a daughter of Pharaoh Ramses II, 
and a sculpture Parry called “The Offeror.” Id. at 396-97. The Offeror 
was confiscated from Parry by British authorities, and although Schultz 
faked an invoice to show it was his, he was unable to reclaim it. Id. at 397. 
Parry and Farag were eventually able to bribe corrupt Egyptian antiquities 
police officers, paying off some of their debts in exchange for antiquities 
in police possession, including one item that still had a partial Egyptian 
government registry number, despite Parry’s attempts to remove it. United 
States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2003). The final item noted 
is “a limestone sculpture of a striding figure,” named “George,” obtained 
from Egyptian villagers. Id. at 397. The men used the same Thomas Alcock 
Collection scheme to try to sell it, but when Schultz could not sell it in New 
York, it was sent to Switzerland, where Parry was not able to retrieve it for 
reasons that remain unclear. Id. at 397.
137 Id. at 397-98 (noting that both men were charged with dealing in stolen 
antiquities).
138 Id. at 398 (detailing Parry and Schultz’s plans to make additional 
acquisitions even after Parry’s arrest).
139 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 2003).
140 Id. (noting that Schultz received a thirty-three-month imprisonment for 
his conviction).
141 Id. Pro-Schultz briefs were from parties such as The National 
Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental & Primitive Art, Inc., The Art 
Dealers Association of America, and The American Society of Appraisers. 
Briefs that opposed Schultz included parties such as The American 
Anthropological Association, The Society for American Archaeology, and 
the Archaeological Institute of America. Id.
142 Id.
143 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2003). Indeed, 
Article 7 of Law 117 outlaws the trade in Egyptian antiquities outright. Id. 
at 399.
144 See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1213 (explaining that Parry and Schultz 
“needed the objects to be from an unpublished tomb, so that the Egyptian 
Government could not identify them as having been removed from Egypt 
in the recent past.”).
145 See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 400 (noting the maximum criminal penalty 
is for smuggling, requiring a fine between 5,000 and 50,000 pounds and 
a prison sentence with hard labor; the minimum criminal penalty is for 
defacement, imposing a prison term of three to twelve months and/or a fine 
of 100 to 500 pounds).
146 Id. at 398-403. The court relied on the opinions of Dr. Gaballa Ali 
Gaballa, Secretary General of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities, 
who clearly stated that the Egyptian government owns all newly discovered 
antiquities, and several people had been prosecuted within Egypt from 
violating Law 117 (where the violations were entirely within Egypt). Id. 
at 400-01. The court also heard from General Ali El Sobky, the Director 
of Criminal Investigations for the Egyptian Antiquities Police, who stated 
that most cases concern antiquities trafficking within Egypt, and even in 
the case of acquittal, the item is retained by the Egyptian government. Id. at 
401. Contra id. at 401 (citing UCLA Law Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl’s 
testimony that Law 117 never established Egypt’s clear ownership rights, 
though he admittedly never practiced in Egypt).
147 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding 
that Law 117 was “clear and unambiguous”).
148 See id. at 399 (stating that the object still must fall within the NSPA’s 
definition of “stolen”).
149 See id. at 402 (citing United States v. Frazier, 584 F.2d 790, 794 
(6th Cir. 1978)).
150 United States v. Benson, 548 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1977).
151 See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 402 (citing Benson, supra note 150, at 46).
152 Id. at 403 (summarizing Shultz’s argument that the holding in McClain 
should be rejected “based on current Second Circuit precedent . . .”). 
Note that the court had earlier stated that the goods were “stolen” if “the 
antiquities [Schultz] conspired to receive in the United States belonged to 
someone who did not give consent for Schultz (or his agent) to take them.” 
Id. at 399.
153 Id. at 404. The court supported this ruling with the holding in 
Hollinshead. See id. at 404 (“[A]n object is ‘stolen’ within the meaning 
of the NSPA if it is taken in violation of a patrimony law.”). But see id. 
at 405 (“The Second Circuit has rarely addressed McClain, and has never 
decided whether the holding of McClain is the law in this Circuit.”). The 
court went on to reject Schultz’s interpretation of the holdings in United 
States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 163, 165 (2d Cir. 1978), 
which cited McClain, 545 F.2d at 163, in a positive light, and United States 
v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1999), which is 
irrelevant. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 405-07 (2d Cir. 2003).
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154 See id. at 408 (noting that Law 117 is not limited only to export 
restrictions).
155 See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 97-564, at 22 (1982)). Indeed, the court 
reasons that the fact that both a civil remedy under the CPIA and a criminal 
remedy under the NSPA may exist does not “limit the reach of the NSPA.” 
Id. at 409 (stating that “the CPIA is an import law not a criminal law.”).
156 Id. at 409-10 (noting the Supreme Court has held the NSPA to apply to 
a broader class of crimes than those contemplated by the common law).
157 See id. at 411 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006)). Concerning Schultz’s 
mistake of Egyptian law, the court noted that “if a jury finds that a 
defendant knew all of the relevant facts, the defendant cannot then escape 
liability by contending that he did not know the law.” See id. (noting that 
Schultz was knowingly participating in a conspiracy to smuggle antiquities 
out of Egypt, and smuggling is not a legal activity).
158 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 412-13 (2d Cir. 2003). The jury 
instructions stated, A defendant may not purposefully remain ignorant of 
either facts or the law in order to escape the consequences of the law . . . 
deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge [is treatable as] the equivalent 
of such knowledge, unless you find the defendant actually believed that the 
antiquities were not the property of the Egyptian government.
Id. at 413.
159 See id. at 416 (noting that determination of relevancy was for the 




162 See id. at 410 (remarking that extending the NSPA to stolen artifacts 
does not conflict with United States policy).
163 See felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 228 (describing that “four 
German antiquities museums agreed to adopt strict guidelines forbidding 
the acquisition of undocumented ancient art.”). But see id. at 232 (quoting 
Giuseppe Proietti, a senior Culture Ministry official in Italy, who described 
the Getty and Met as “rogue museums” due to their known involvement 
with art traffickers).
164 Kreder, supra note 74, at 1218-19.
165 See id. at 1219 (The Quedlinburg treasures were a ‘trove of gold, silver 
and bejeweled medieval manuscripts [hidden in a cave during the war] near 
the Quedlenburg Cathedral, their home for the previous 1,000 years.’ One 
such treasure covered with precious stones is believed to have belonged to 
Henry I. The treasures have been described as ‘one of the most important 
collections of religious art of the Middle Ages.’).
166 Id. at 1219-20. But see id. at 1220 (noting that Meador was court-
martialed in 1945 for stealing valuable French china from a chateau).
167 See Gov’t of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810, 812 (C.D. Cal. 1989) 
aff’d sub nom. Gov’t of Peru v. Wendt, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that Peru couldn’t establish that the artifacts were illegally 
excavated because it was unclear when they were unearthed or from what 
country they were from).
168 Borodkin, supra note 1, at 395 (noting the difficulties in establishing 
the elements in a NSPA prosecution).
169 Id. at 395-96 (describing the rule in Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 810, 
places claimant nations in an evidentiary Catch-22; if the claimant had the 
ability to police all the archaeological sites in its borders, it would not have 
to seek an NSPA suit as the object would never leave the country).
170 See Center Art Galleries—Hawaii, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 747, 
747 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving the sale of a forged Salvador Dali painting); 
Borodkin, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that defendants were convicted under 
mail and wire fraud statutes to three years and thirty months, respectively, 
for selling forged prints).
171 Snider v. Lone Star Art Tracing Co., 672 F. Supp. 977, 979 (E.D. Mich. 
1987) (denying all but one of the defendants’ motions for reconsideration 
and allowing the plaintiff to file an amended complaint).
172 See Borodkin, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that the defendants attempted 
to argue that their actions did not constitute the separate acts required for a 
“pattern” of behavior required for a RICO violation); see also Faircloth v. 
Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 514 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding defendants liable for 
triple damages under RICO for giving out fraudulent estimates of a Picasso 
“art master” (template for making reproductions) and obtaining a fraudulent 
opinion letter stating the art masters could be used as tax shelters).
173 United States v. Clack, 957 F.2d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
the jury rejected the defendant’s insanity defense).
174 See Borodkin, supra note 1, at 397 (“If a claimant could show 
that smuggler used force in the course of trafficking, the Hobbs Act could 
possibly apply to international cases as well.”).
175 felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 181-83 (regarding the Met’s 
repatriation battle with the Italian government over a collection of ancient 
silver vessels and other artifacts).
176 See id. at 111.
177 See id. at 20-21 (noting that the idea for the museum came from Getty’s 
long-time accountant).
178 See id. at 21 (noting that museum hours were from Wednesday 
to Friday, 3 to 5 PM, with required reservations for the parking lot).
179 See id. at 25 (describing the exuberance of the museum employees after 
learning of Getty’s bequest to the museum).
180 See id. (noting that the museum board unanimously agreed to the $3.95 
million dollar purchase price, even though Getty himself had recently 
refused to pay such a price). The Getty Bronze was discovered somewhere 
in the Adriatic by the crew of the fishing trawler Ferrucio Ferri in 1964. 
felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 9-10. It was brought back to the 
town of Fano, Italy and moved to the captain’s cousin’s house, who invited 
local dealers to inspect it. Id. at 10-11. They rejected offers of up to one 
million lire, demanding more, and buried the statue in a cabbage field 
to prevent its discovery. Id. at 11. It was shown to Giacomo Barbetti, a 
wealthy antiquarian, a month later, and he proclaimed that it was the work 
of Lysippus, a famous ancient Greek sculptor (the personal sculptor of 
Alexander the Great). Id. at 12. The authors surmise that the Getty Bronze 
was likely taken in raids by Romans of the Greek mainland and islands 
around the beginning of the first millennium AD. Id. at 11-12. Barbetti 
purchased the statue for 3.5 million lire, approximately $4,000, split among 
the crew (the captain received $1,600, double his monthly wage). felCh & 
frammolino, supra note 1, at 12. Barbetti moved the statue to a church in 
Gubbio where it was hidden by the church priest under a red velvet curtain 
in the sacristy, until the stench became unbearable and the priest moved it 
to his home, submerging it in salt water. Id. at 12. From there, the story gets 
murky. By the time the Carabinieri, the Italian national police, showed up, 
it was gone to Milan, France, or even a monastery in Brazil. Id. at 12-13. 
Though the Italian government filed criminal charges against Barbetti and 
the priest for violating Italian cultural property law (all objects found after 
1939 are objects of the state, and possessors of such objects are guilty of 
theft) in 1966, the case was eventually dismissed for lack of evidence. Id. 
at 13. The statue emerged in London three years later, apparently hidden 
in the Brazilian monastery before being sold for $700,000 to Artemis, a 
Luxembourg-based art consortium. Id. German antiquities dealer Heinz 
Herzer, a member of Artemis, shipped the statue to his studio in Munich, 
carefully removing the detritus that was encrusting it and taking painstak-
ing steps to ensure its preservation. felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, 
at 13. Herzer also concluded the statue to be the work of Lysippus, and 
obtained the expert opinion of Bernard Ashmole, curator of Greek and 
Roman art at the British Museum, to back up this claim. Id. at 14. Ashmole 
discussed selling the statue to J. Paul Getty, but he refused to buy it unless 
there were assurances regarding its legal status and provenance as well as 
a five-year money-back guarantee in the event of a patrimony claim. Id. 
at 20. Around the same time, German and Italian police raided Herzer’s 
studio in Munich, questioning him about the statue’s journey, and he only 
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escaped arrest when German authorities refused to extradite him to Italy to 
be prosecuted for trafficking looted art. Id. With Getty’s death, the museum 
was no longer “required” to establish provenance, and readily bought the 
statue for $3.95 million, without permission from Italian authorities. felCh & 
frammolino, supra note 1, at 25. The Getty Bronze was shipped from London 
to Boston, quietly exhibited in the Denver Art Museum to avoid California 
taxes, before it went to the Getty in mid-November 1977. Id. This remarkable 
story illustrates only part of the depth of the smuggling scheme employed by 
dealers and purchasers of art to acquire valuable and exquisite items.
181 See id. at 195-202 (noting the Italian government’s investigation 
concerning looted artifacts, many of which were considered to be among 
The Getty’s best pieces).
182 See id. at 32 (mentioning that the scheme “might even be legal”).
183 See id. at 32-37, 49-50 (noting that this tax fraud scheme resulted in over 
a hundred donors giving six thousand antiquities valued at $14.7 million over 
four years. The authors further note that Frel would enter the museum with 
items stuffed in his pockets and that “a number of donations came through 
Frel’s new wife.”). Frel was put on leave in 1984, resigned in 1986, and the 
story about the tax fraud broke in 1987. felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, 
at 81-82.
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